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APPENDIX

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH PIPE LINE CO}.lP ANY, a
corporation,
Petitioner,
-vs.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UT_..\_H, HAL S. BENNETT,
W. R. McENTIRE and STEWART
l\L HANSON, Commissioners of the
Public Service Commission of Utah;
and UTAH NATURAL GAS COMpANY, a corporation,
Respondents.

Case No.
7695

PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON RESPONDENTS'
MOTIONS TO DISMISS

STATEMENT
This is an appeal to this Honorable Court by writ of
certiorari from the proceedings, Findings and Report
and Order, of the Public Service Commission of Utah in
case No. 3504 amended, before said Commission, entitled
"In the matter of the Application of Utah Natural Gas
Company for a certificate of convenience and necessity."
The petition for writ of certiorari was filed by Utah Pipe
Line Company, a corporation, an intervener in the abOive
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proceedings before the Public S.ervice Commission of
Utah under and by virtue of Section 76-6-16 of the Utah
Code Annotated, 1943. The writ of certiorari thus petitioned for was granted by this Court. Respondents have
now filed their motions to dismiss the petition for writ
of certiorari and the writ of certiorari "on the grounds
and for the reason that it affirmatively appears from
said petition for writ of certiorari that the petitioner,
Utah Pipe Line Company, does not have a justiciable
interest in the subject matter of the action." Except as
where otherwise indicated, all underscoring is supplied.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES.
POINT ONE - Title 76 Utah Code Annotated,
1943 expressly gives petitioner, as an aggrieved
party, a right of review in this Court.
The subject matter of this action is, of course, the
application of Utah Natural Gas Company to the Public
Service Commission of Utah in case No. 3504, Amended,
"In the matter of the Application of Utah Natural Gas
Company for a certificate of convenience and necessity,"
and the proceedings conducted before the Commission
thereon and the Findings and Report and the Order issued therein by the c·ommission.
Title 76 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, concerns
public utility regulation and contains the statutes providing for and regulating proceedings such as the one concerned in this appeal. Section 76-4-24 provides in substance thatthe pub~ic utilities there listed, including the
type of public utility involved in the proceedings before
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the Commission in this rase, shall not construct or operate certain facilities 'Yithout having first obtained
from the Commission a certificate that present or future
public convenience and necessity does or will require such
construction. The section further provides that the
Commission shall have power after a hearing to issue or
refuse the certificate in whole or in part.
Chapter 6 of the above title concerns the procedure
to be followed in proceedings before the Commission
under such title. Section 76-6-10 provides that:
" ...:\_t the time fixed for any hearing before the
Commission or a Commissioner, or at the time
to which the same may have been continued, the
complainant and the corporation or person complained of, and such corporations or persons as
the Commission may allow to intervene shall be
entitled to be heard and to introduce evidence."
Section 76-6-15 provides for rehearing before the
Commission after any order or decision made by the
Commission, and allows "any party to the action or pro"""
ceeding, or any stockholder or bondholder or other party
pecuniarily interested in the public utility affected" to
apply for such rehearing. The section also provides that
such application for rehearing shall be a prerequisite to
appeal. Section 76-6-16 provides for the exclusive method
of judicial review applicable in proceedings before the
Public Service Commission. This exclusive method of
review is, of course, by petition £or writ of certiorari
to the Supren1e Court of the State of Utah. Such section
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

provides, in part, that within thirty days after the rendition of the decision on rehearing,
"the applicant or any party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such order or
decision rendered upon rehearing may apply to
the S·upreme Court for a writ of certiorari for
the purpose of having the lawfulness of the original order or decision, or the order or decision
on rehearing, inquired into and determined.

* * * *
"The review shall not be extended further
than to determine whether the Commission has
regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order or decision under
review violates any right of the petitioner under
the Constitution of the United States or of the
State of Utah."
Pursuant to and in accordance with such statutes,
the Commission has adopted its Rules of Practice and
Pr.ocedure, of which the following are here pertinent
and are quoted:
6.1-"Parties to proceedings before the Commission shall be applicants, complainants, petitioners, defendants, respondents, interveners, or
protestants, according to the nature of the proceeding and the relationship of the parties thereto."
6.8-"An Intervener is a party who has been
permitted to become a party to any proceeding
before the Commission."
6.10-"N o person will be allowed to intervene
in any proceeding unless it shall be made to ap-
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pear to the Con1mission that he has a direct interest therein."
19.6-"'Vithin thirty days after the rendition
of the derision on rehearing, any party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such order
or decision, may apply to the Supreme Court for a
\vrit of certiorari for the purpose of having the
lawfulness of the original order or decision or the
order or decision of the rehearing inquired into
and determined."
In accordance with the above quoted rules, and pursuant to the authority granted to it by s.ection 76-6-10,
the Commission found that the petitioner, Utah Pipe
Line Company, had sufficient interest and was allowed
to intervene and thereby "became a party to the proceeding.'' Rule 6.8 abo;ve quoted.
The Commission allowed not only your petitioner,
Utah Pipe Line Company, to intervene and become a
party, but also allowed others such as the Mountain Fuel
Supply Company, the Ut~h Home Builders Association,
several railroad companies, the Utah Coal Operators
Association and the United Mine Workers of America,
District 22, to intervene as parties. Such interveners
participated in the hearing as parties and cross examined
witnesses and offered evidence insofar as the Commission
allowed.
As heretofore pointed out, Section 76-6-16 of the
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, allows "the applicant or any
party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by
such order or decision" to apply to the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari. The test under the applicable
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Utah statutes herein quoted, then, is not "Does the party
petitioning for review have a justiciable interest in the
subject matter" as indicated by respondents' motions to
dismiss, but is, "Is the person petitioning for review
a party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved."
It is submitted that any of the above interveners, as
parties to such proceeding, had the right under the above
quoted statutes of this state, if he deemed himself aggrieved, to follow the same procedure that has been followed by one of those parties, namely, Utah Pipe Line
Company, your petitioner herein. It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that respondents' motions to dismiss
are not well taken.
A statute which is very similar to the Utah statute
and which deals with appeal from Federal Power Commission rulings is the applicable section of the Natural
Gas Act of the United States, 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 717 r (b)
which reads in part as follows:
"Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the c·ommission in such proceeding may obtain a r~view of
such order in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
United States .... "
The right of parties to appeal under this section
apparently has not been raised in very many cases. In
the case of Cia. Mexicana De Gas v. F. P. C. (CCA 5th
1948), 167 F. 2d 804, interveners sought review of the
action of the F·ederal Power Commission in granting to
Reynosa Pipe Line Co. a permit and a certificate of conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ven1ence and necessity to export gas from Texas to
Reynosa, Mexico. The interveners were Mexicana, a
pipeline co1npany already serving R.eynosa with Texas
gas, and the Railroad Comn1ission of Texas, the state
conservation agency \Yhich intervened to prevent the exportation of Texas gas and to preserve it for domestic
use. Reynosa n1oved to dismiss, urging that petitioners
were not aggrieved persons under the Natural Gas Act.
The Court said, at page 805 :
··we make short work of Reynosa's motion to
dismiss. We think that petitioners are aggrieved
parties 'vithin the meaning of the act, and, as such,
are rightfully here."
A note in 49 Columbia Law Review 759-795, (1949) entitled "Standing to Challenge and to Enforce Administrative Action" undertakes a thorough-going analysis of the
nature of the right which entitles a person to appeal to
the courts for review o.f administrative orders. This
article re-examines the leading cases bearing on this
problem to show the confusion and complete irrationality which has resulted from an attempt to transfer into
the specialized field of administrative law theories de- ·
veloped to suit general legal requirements. It is demonstrated that the theory of case or controversy and the
theory damnum absque injuria have been greatly dis-

torted and have lost their original validity by application
to the problem of challenge to an administrative determination. After an examination of the various federal statutes providing for review of administrative orders and
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the leading cases in respect to these statutes, the writer
formulates some tests:
"Sound development of the law of standing
requires a stripping away of the highly conceptual
and needlessly complex refinements concerning
'interest,' 'rights,' and private representation of
the public interest. Every issue of standing, unless
the statute raises unusual issues, involves the
basically simple problem of whether or not the
petitioner's asserted interest is in the circumstances deserving of legal protection. That problem may be and should be discussed without any
attendant complexity of doctrine. Some of the
principal elements of that problem are: (page 7912)

* * * *
"2. The constitutional requirement of case
or controversy is satisfied when substantial interests of parties on each side have in fact collided-when the party seeking to challenge or to
enforce administrative action has a substantial
interest at stake. Despite the formulation of the
doctrine of damnum absque injuria as requiring a
'legal right,' a legislative intent, whether express
or implied or read into the statute by the courts,
is often enough to provide standing to challenge
or to enforce administrative action. The explanation of this may be either that the statute relaxes
the requirement of a 'right' and makes an 'interest' enough, or the explanation may be that
the statute creates a 'right' to judicial review;
nothing of substance hinges on the choice of
phraseology."
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Further, \Yith reference to the effect of a statute
providing for a revie,v-, this writer said:

''.A. case or controversy which is otherwise
lacking cannot be created by statute; Congress
tried that "Tithout success in the Muskrat case.
Nevertheless, a statute may create new interests
or rights, thereby giving standing to one other\vise barred either by lack of case or controversy
or by damnmn absque injuria. And a statute conferring standing may affect the detemination of
whether or not a right or a case or controversy
exists. (page 764)
"The effect of such a statutory provision may
be illustrated by comparing Oklahoma v. Civil
Service Commission with Massachusetts v. Mellon.
In the Oklahoma case, the Civil Service Commission entered an order finding a violation of the
Hatch Act by a member of the state highway commission; this finding foreshadowed a further
order reducing federal highway grants to Oklahoma, unless the State removed the offending
commissioner from office. Oklahoma instituted
proceedings for review pursuant to a provision
allowing review by 'any party aggrieved.' Under
Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Court might have
said that Oklahoma was not compelled to take
any federal funds, that acceptance of funds rested
on consent, and that Oklahoma had no standing
to question the validity of federal grants. Instead,
the Court held that the federal statute created a
'legal right' in Oklahoma, and that 'By providing
for judicial review of the orders of the Civil
Service Commission, Congress made Oklahoma's
right to receive funds a matter of judicial cognizance. Oklahoma's right became legally enforceable.' The Court distinguished Massachusetts v.
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Mellon, the Lukens Steel case, and the Alabama
Power case by emphasizing 'the authority for
statutory review and . . . the existence of the
legally enforceable right to receive allocated
grants without unlawful deductions.' "
The Massachusetts v. Mellon, Lukens Steel and
Alabama Power cases referred to above are the foundation decisions of the damnum absque injuria theory which
denied petitioners in these cases the right to judicial
review. In the Oklahoma case, (Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127, 91 L. ed. 794 [1947] ), however, Congress had provided that " (c) any party aggrieved by any . . . order of the Commission... " may
have the order reviewed by filing a petition with the
federal court. This statute, said the U. S. Supreme Court
was sufficient:
"Issues presented by this suit, even though
raised by a state, are closely akin to private
wrongs. ~ .. Congress has power to fix conditions
for review of administrative orders. By providing
for judicial review of orders of the Civil Service
Commission, Congress made Oklahoma's right to
receive funds a matter of judicial cognizance."
(Pages 803-91 L. ed.)
In the Rhode Island case of Public Utilities Commission v. PrDvidence Gas Co., 104 Ati.· 609, there was involved a rate order by the Public Service Commission
of that state fixing rates for gas service in certain coinmunities. In such proceedings the cities and towns affected were allowed to and did intervene, contesting the
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fixing of rates. There \Yas an appeal by the city and to,vn
and the above cited opinion involved a -motion of the gas
company to disn1iss the appeal. The court held that 'vhere
the gas company, under Public La\YS 1912, chapter 795,
applied to the Public Service Commission to fix rates,
the city and to,vn affected thereby, having intervened
under Rule 3 of the Com1nission as authorized by Section
17 of such ..._let, had the right to appeal notwithstanding
Section 3-± of the Act limits appeal to a "complainant."
The sections and rule referred to read as follows :
Section 34---"Any public utility or any complainant aggrieved by any order of the Commission fixing any rate, toll, charge, joint rate
or rates ... may appeal to the Supreme Court
for a reversal of such order."
Section 17-"All hearings, investigations and inquiries before the Commission shall be governed by rules to be adopted and prescribed
by the Commission .... "
Rule 3-"Parties or utilities not parties, may petition in any proceeding for leave to intervene
and be heard therein. Such petition shall set
forth the petitioner's interest in the proceeding. The leave granted on such application
shall entitle the intervener to appear and be
treated as a party to the proceeding."
In makings its holding, the Court said, at page 610:
" ... In the circumstance of the matter we are
of the opinion that, when said city and town were
permitted to intervene as parties in the proceeding, which under the statute was being conducted
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as t4ough it was a complaint filed with the Commission, they intervened as parties complainant,
with the rights of complainants, including the
right of appeal from the final order afterwards
made by the Commission."
Another Rhode Island case is Attleboro Steam &
Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 129 Atl. 495.
The case there involved was a proceeding to fix electric
rates of N arragonsett Electric Lighting Co. The Attleboro Company was a user of Narragonsett electricity
and intervened. Attleboro was here appealing from the
Commission's order. The c·ourt said at page 497:
"The Attleboro Co. is properly here by appeal. Sec. 34, c. 795, provides that any public
utility or any complainant aggrieved by any order
of the Commission fixing any rate, etc., may appeal to the Supreme Court for a reversal of such
order. The Attleboro Co. is not a 'public utility'
as that term is used in the Act ( 32) nor is it
strictly a 'complainant' in the technical sense, as
the original proceeding was begun by the Commission on its own motion (sec. 26). The Commission
by sec. 28 is required to give notice to such interested parties as the Commission shall deem necessary as provided in section 20. This latter section requires the Commission to give to 'the public
utility' and 'complainant,' if any, 10 days' notice
of the time and place of the hearings. Sec. 28
provides that, after notice is given, the proceedings shall be conducted in like manner as if complaint had been filed with the Commission relative to the matter investigated. Sec. 58 provides
that the provisions of the Act shall be interpreted
and construed liberally in order to accomplish the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
purposes thereof. One evident purpose of the
statute is to subject any order of the Commission
'Yhereby anyone is legally aggrieved to review
by the Supreme Court. The Attleboro Co. after
appearing at the hearing in response to the notice
and thereafter taking part in the proceedings,
thereby became a complainant "\Yithin the meaning
of the statute, and "ras Yested 'vith all the rights
of a complainant, including, of course, the right of
appeal. See P. lT. Comn1. v. Prov. Gas Co. 42 R.I.
1, 10± . .:~. 609."
Another authority dealing 'vith statutory provisions
similar to the l~tah statutes is the case of Lang v. Railroad Connnission of California (Sup. Ct. California,
1935) 42 P. 2d 639. In that case the Supreme Court of
California had before it an appeal by certain truck tank
carriers of petroleum, who had intervened in a hearing
before the Railroad Commission of California, which
hearing was to inquire into the reasonableness of rate
tariffs which had been filed by rail tank carriers of petroleum. The railroads ·were cutting their prices for petroleum, attempting to regain some of the business lost to
truck carriers. The Commission was inquiring in~o this
reduction to see whether or not other traffic was being
burdened by such cut, and the truck operators intervened to contest the cut. From an order which, in effect,
approved such reductions, the interveners appealed to
the S-upreme Court.
The sections of the statutes involved and referred to
in the opinion are here quoted to show the remarkable
resemblance to the Utah statutes:
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Sec. 61 (a)-"At the time fixed for any hearing
before the commission or a commissioner, or
the time to which the same may have been
continued, the complainant and the corporation or persons complained of, and such corporation or persons as the commission may
allow to intervene, should be entitled to be
heard and to introduce evidence .... "
Sec. 66-"After any order or decision has been
made by the commission, any party to the
action or proceeding, or any stockholder or
bondholder or other party pecuniarily interested in the public utility affected, may apply
for a rehearing in respect to any matters determined in said action or proceeding and
specified in the application for rehearing.

"
Sec. 67-"Within thirty days after the application
for a rehearing is denied, or, if the application is granted, then within 30 days after the
rendition of the decision on rehearing, the
applicant may apply to the Supreme Court
of this State for a writ of certiorari or review ... for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the original order or decision or the
order or decision on rehearing inquired into
and determined.... "
On appeal, the railroads contended that the petitioners were mere interveners in the matter of the suspension of said rates, and as such had no right to maintain that appeal. In answer to such contention, the Court
stated, at page 641:
"We do not so understand the position of the
petitioners. While the commission, upon its
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o'vn initiative, suspended the operation of said
rates, the record sho\\ys that thereafter the petitioners, and other tank truck carriers, protested
the rates as filed by the rail carriers, and the
matter 'Yas thereafter heard upon the protest of
the tank truck carriers as well as upon the voluntary action of the commission in temporarily
suspending said rates. But even as mere interveners, they are made parties to the controversy,
(section 61, subd. (a), Public Utilities Act, St.
1915, pp. 115, 158, Act 6386, Deering's Gen. Laws,
1931), and, as such, could petition for a rehearing (section 66, Public Utilities Act, St. 1915, pp.
115, 160, Act 6386, Deering's Gen. Laws, 1931),
and upon its denial could apply to this court for
a writ of review for the purpose of determining
the lawfulness of said order (section 67, Public
l ... tilities Act, St. 1915, p. 161, as amended by St.
1933, p. 1157, Act 6386, Deering's Gen. Laws Supp.
1933) ."

An interesting case illustrating the type of interests
allowed to appeal under the Natural Gas Act is Kentucky
Natural Gas Corp. v. Federal Power Commission (CCA
6th 1947), 159 F. 2d 215. In that case Kentucky was appealing from an order granting a certificate of convenience and necessity to Central Illinois Public Service Co.
and denying it to Kentucky. Both had applied for a certificate for a twenty mile line which would come into
the area already being served by Central Illinois. Both
would have procured their gas from the same pipeline
company, Panhandle Eastern. At the time of the application Central Illinois purchased from Kentucky the
gas it delivered to the area to which the new twenty mile
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line would be constructed, and this new line was a lateral
line which would relieve Central Illinois from having
to duplicate its line from Kentucky's delivery point.
FTom the facts in the case, it does not appear that the
two companies were in any wa;Y competitors. They were
only competitors in the sense that they were competing
for a certificate for a new pipe line to serve one market.
Kentucky appealed without any question of its right to
do so.
Another Federal statute with wording similar to
the part of section 76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
dealing with appeal, is the section of the Federal Communications Act dealing with appeals from actions of
the Federal Communications Commission, namely, 47
U.S.C.A. sec. 402 (b) which reads in part:
"(b) An appeal may be taken, in the manner
hereinafter provided, from decisions of the Commission to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in any of the followIng cases:
"(1) By any applicant for a construction permit for a radio station, or for a radio
station license, or for renewal of an existing
radio station license, or for modification of
an existing radio station license, whose application is refused by the Commission.
"(2) By any other person aggrieved or
whose interests are adversely affected by any
decision of the Commission granting or refusing any such application."
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ferent fron1 the 'Yording in the lT tah proYision (sec. 766-16, supra) both in granunatical construction and in
that it includes "any other person" rather than limiting
the section to a party to the proceeding. The following
cases construing such section are helpful, ho\vever, in
demonstrating ":rhat has been considered an "aggrieved
person."
In the case of }~ ankee Network v. Federal Comn~?Jni
cations Commission (C.A.D.C. 1939), 107 F. 2d 212, Yankee Net,vork, the owner of existing stations in the Boston area, was appealing from an order granting the application of The Northern Corporation to construct another
station in that area. Yankee was appealing on the ground
that the granting of ano"ther permit adversely affected
their economic interest in their present stations. The
right of Yankee to appeal under section 402 (b) (2),
sttpra, was vigorously attacked by the Commission on
the ground that the act did not contemplate an appeal
from the granting of an application where the appeal
was brought by an existing licensee claiming to be economically affected. The Court held that Yankee did
have the right to appeal under section 402 (b) (2), supra,
on the grounds that its economic interests were adversely
affected and rejected the Commission's contention that
Yankee must show an appealable interest which is protectible as a legal interest in a Court under Common
Law principles.
In the case of Ward v. Federal Communications
Oomm. (C.A.D.C. 1939), 108 F. 2d 486, the same c·ourt
held, at page 487, that a station owner in Memphis,
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Tennessee was an aggrieved person under the above
quoted section and could appeal from the granting of an
application to operate a station in Boston on the same
frequency as the Memphis station on the grounds that the
Boston station would create objectionable electrical interference with his Memphis station.
In reference to a situation where there are two applications for certificates for the same privilege or right,
this same opinion reads as follows, at page 490:
"We have said that if the Commission's prior
consideration of a previously filed and co-pending
application-where request has been made for
joint consideration-has 'seriously prejudiced' an
applicant we would have a case in which we might
say that the latter applicant has an appealable
interest as a person aggrieved.... "
This honorable Court has at least once indicated
what is considered the essential element involved in making a party aggrieved. In the case of Openshaw v. Openshaw (Sup. Ct. Utah 1943) 144 P. 2d 528, the plaintiff
filed suit to seek alimony upon a divorce decree, and
from an insufficient judgment, she appealed. Defendant
moved to dismiss the appeal of plaintiff on the ground
that she was not an aggrieved party and was not prejudiced because she actually got a judgment for a substantial part of what she claimed. The Court dismissed
the motion, saying, at page 530 :
"104-41-4, U.C.A. 1943, provides that 'any
party to a judgment or decree may appeal therefrom.' Neither the constitution nor the statute
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lin1its the right of appeal to the party or parties
against 'vhom a judgment or decree is rendered.
. .:\ssuming the correctness of respondent's contention to the effect that a party must be 'aggrieved'
before he can appeal, nevertheless, if he fails to recover in substance "That he claims he was entitled
to receive, he is aggrieved."
On the basis of the foregoing, it would definitely appear that, for an appeal to be made to this honorable
Court from a final order of the Public Service Commission of L"tah, the law of Utah requires only that the
party seeking the review be a "party to the proceeding
deeming himself aggrieved" and that there is no requirement such as respondents urge by their motions to dismiss. This is more than adequately confirmed by the
foregoing authorities and by the accepted standards.
Petitioner, Utah Pipe Line Company, has, by its Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed with this Court, established that it is a party "deeming itself aggrieved." It
is respectfully submitted, therefore, that Respondents'
Motions to Dismiss should be overruled.
POINT TWO-Independent of the right of review provided by the Utah statute, petitioner
has such special interest in the subject matter of
the action as to warrant review by this Court.

Let us assume, for the purposes of argument, that,
In spite of the clear wording in Section 76-6-16, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, to the effect that "any party to the
proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such order
or decision ... may apply to the supreme court for a writ
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of certiorari" and that "the prov1s1ons of the code of
civil procedure relating to writs of review shall so far
as applicable and not in conflict with the provisions of
this chapter apply to proceedings instituted in the supreme court under the provisions of this section,"
nevertheless the wording of Section 104-67-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, is construed to require some "beneficial
interest." The wording of that section, dealing in general with applications to this Court for writs of certiorari,
reads in part: "The application must be made, on affidavit, by the party beneficially interested.... '' If such
wording is interpreted as requiring some special interest
in the subject matter of the litigation, it is submitted
that petitioner, Utah Pipe Line Company, has that interest.
In the case of McCarthy v. Public Service Commission of Utah (Sup. Ct. of Utah, 1938) 77 P. 2d 331, this
honorable Court had before it an appeal by writ of certiorari instituted under what is now Section 104-67-3 of
the Utah Code Annotated, 1943. Action was on certiorari
to review and annul an order of the Public Service Commission of Utah, granting to the defendants a permit
to operate as a contract motor carrier of property over
the public highways of the state. The plaintiffs were common carriers of property and passen_gers over private
lines of railroads or the public highways of the state,
operating under certificates of convenience and necessity.
After the issuance of the permit complained of to the
defendants, the plaintiffs, desiring to oppose the same,
filed with the Commission their petitions for a rehearing
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and reconsideration of the aetion so taken, praying- that
the pern1it be vacated or denied. The Commission denied
the plaintiffs' petitions, and under the section hereto-fore referred to, the plaintiffs sought revie"~ in this Court
by writ of certiorari. It "~as contended by defendants
that plaintiffs had no special, direct or immediate interest in the proceeding or decision complained of, and
were not injured thereby since they still might seek and
obtain all the transportation business they could get, the
same after as before the decision. Concerning this contention, this court said, at page 335 :

""T e cannot assent to this view. The plaintiffs
have a special interest in opposing the defendant
Company's application for a permit in excess of
and different from the interest of the community
in general. In quality, plaintiffs' interest in opposing the application is exactly the same as that
of the Company in maintaining it, namely, the
effect thereof upon their prospect for earning
money in their business. The available supply of
business over a given route or over all routes covered by their common facilities is the source from
which the earnings of each carrier must come.
Whatever subtracts from the total volume of business is a diminution of earning capacity for those
who must compete for and share in the remainder
and who have equipped themselves at large expense for carrying a larger share of the business.
True, no carrier has a property interest in any
specific business or shipment until he actually
gets it, connects with it, appropriates it, by contracting therefor with the shipper. But he is entitled to his chance as a competitor at all the business there is as against anyone proceeding unlawSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fully or without due authorization of the statute
to divert or appropriate any part of it."
In the case now before this Court, Utah Pipe Line
Company and Utah Natural Gas Company were, at the
time of the hearing, and are until this appeal is disposed
of, competitors for the right to construct a pipe line
along virtually the same route, and to serve the identical
principal market. The success of Utah Pipe Line Company's application before the F'ederal Power Co1nmission,
of its application before the Public Service Commission
of Utah, and of the proposed construction of its pipe
line, depend upon its success in contesting the application of Utah Natural Gas Company; for it cannot, practically speaking, proceed if the certificate of Utah Natural
Gas Company is allowed to stand, and it is here, in good
faith, attacking the granting of such certificate to its
competitor on the many grounds set out in its petition.
A case similar to that before this Court is Western
Pacific California Company v. Southern Pacific Company, 284 U.S. 47-52, 76 L. ed. 160 where petitioner,
a railroad corporation, proposed to construct a 25-mile
railroad along the shore of S.an Fl'ancisco Bay. Western
Pacific made application to the Interstate Commerce
Commission for authority to construct the road, and
the Southern Pacific Company appeared in opposition.
Before the application was heard by the Commission,
Southern Pacific Company began extending its tracks
into the same area that Western Pacific proposed to
serve, whereupon Western Pacific brought this suit to
enjoin such extension. The trial court entered a decree
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granting a per1nanent injunction. On appeal the 9th
Circuit (46 Federal 2d 7:29) reversed, holding that WPstern Pacific 'vas not a ·~party in interest," the circuit court
saYJ.ng:
~· ...\s

appears from the foregoing statement,
the appellee has been organized as a corporation,
has projected a line of railroad, and has applied
to the Interstate Commerce Commission for a
certificate of necessity. On these facts, without
1nore, without a railroad, without a right of way,
and 'vithout traffic to protect, it sought a permanent injunction enjoining the appellant from building a spur track, or extending its line, as the case
may be. Such showing will not, in our opinion,
support or justify an injunction such as was
granted here."
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court the decision
of the Circuit Court was reversed, the Supreme Court
saymg:
"If, as the court below seems to have assumed,
a 'party in interest' must possess some clear legal
right for which it might ask protection under the
rules commonly accepted by courts of equity, the
paragraphs under consideration would not materially aid the Congressional plan for promoting
transportation. On the other hand, there was no
purpose to permit any individual so inclined to
institute such a proceeding. The complainant must
possess something more than a common concern
for obedience to law. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 67 L. ed. 1078, 1085, 43 S.
Ct. 597. It will suffice, we think if the bill discloses that some definite legal right possessed
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by complainant is seriously threatened or that
the unauthorized and therefore unlawful action of
the defendant carrier may directly and adversely
affect the complainant's welfare by bringing abo~t
some material change in the transportation situation. Here, the petitioner was peculiarly concerned; its own welfare was seriously threatened.
It alleged the beginning of an unlawful undertaking by a carrier which might prove deleterious
to it as well as to the public interest in securing
and maintaining proper railroad service without
undue loss. It relied upon the procedure prescribed by the statute to secure an orderly hearing
and proper determination of the matter. The disclosures of the bill were enough to show that the
respondent's intended action might directly and
seriously affect the project which complainant
was undertaking in good faith. There was enough
to give the latter the standing of a 'party in interest' within intendment of the Act." (76 L. ed.
at page 162)
A California case dealing with the requirement of
beneficial interest in its statute is Bodinson Manufacturing Company v. California Employment Commission
(Sup. Ct. of California, 1941), 109 P. 2d 935. In that case
the petitioner before the Supreme Court sought a writ
of mandamus to compel the employment commission to
set aside its decision awarding unemployment compensation to two persons, to compel it to deny such compensation to other persons, and to compel it to correct
petitioner's merit rating under the Unemployment Insurance Act. The petitioner was an employer who had,
at one time, employed the persons, compensation for
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,vhon1 he \Yas opposing. The court observed, in its opinion, that the \Yrit of mandan1us in California was the
proper method of appealing from alleged illegal administrative actions. The respondents contended that
the employer \Yas not a proper party to ehallenge the decision of the Con1n1ission awarding benefits under the
Act. In rejecting this contention, the court stated, at
page 941:
""In providing for manda1nus proceedings the
Code of Civil Procedure, section 1086, requires

only that the petitioner be a party 'beneficially
interested.' The act provides in section 67, St.
1939, p. 3010, that 'any employer whose reserve
account may be affected by the payment of benefits to any individual formerly in his employ may
become an interested party to any proceeding
under this article.... ' It is conceded that the petitioner took the required steps to become an interested party under the statute in the present case
and, indeed, was the moving party in appealing to
the full Commission from the decision awarding
benefits to the correspondents. We are aware of
no authority which holds that a person permitted
by statute to participate as an interested party
in the administrative hearings and to take appeals at the administrative level is, nevertheless,
without a sufficient interest in the result to test
the legality of the final decision before a court
of law. Indeed, it seems to us that elemental principles of justice require that parties to the administrative proceeding be permitted to retain
their status as such throughout the final judicial
review by a court of law, for the fundamental issues in litigation remain essentially the same."
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Further, in addition to the foregoing, it is submitted
that petitioner can and has shown that it is vitally interested in this proceeding, and has whatever interest
is necessary to prosecute this appeal. On December 11,
1950 at the commencement of the hearing complained
of before the Commission, petitioner Utah Pipe Line
c·ompany, as set out in its petition for writ of certiorari,
presented its petition to the Commission for leave to intervene in the proceedings then about to begin, in which
petition the Utah Pipe Line Company represented that
there was then pending before the Federal Power Commission its application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction and operation
of a natural gas pipe line from Northwestern New Mexico
to the Salt Lake City, Utah, market, and that the lTtah
Pipe Line Co1npany felt that the Utah Natural Gas Company, which was then seeking a certificate of convenience
and necessity from the Public Service Commission of Utah
to build a pipe line from Southeastern Utah to the Salt
Lake City market, was not capable of supplying the
service but that Utah Pipe Line Company was capable
of supplying it, and that the two parties were potential
competitors, and that the public interest involved in the
awarding of a certificate of convenience and necessity
required that the qualifications of both parties be fully
investigated. The Commission granted petitioner Utah
Pipe Line Company the right to intervene, but restricted
its intervention to show only why the Utah Natural Gas
Company's application should not be granted.
This very restriction of intervention is one of the
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.. points upon 'vhich petitioner, lTtah Pipe Line Co1npany
now seeks revie,Y. The petitioner has assailed such ruling and restriction by the Con11uission as an action vv hich,
is arbitrary and capricious and in Yiolation of the due
process clause of the Constitution of the State of Utah
and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the l~nited States. Petitioner has followed the sole and
exclusive statutory method of appeal from rulings and
orders of the Public Service Commission of the State
of Utah, and if this appeal, by the sole and exclusive
method of writ of certiorari, is not allowed, petitioner
has no other recourse to secure review of the wrongs
complained of in such ruling. Certainly, then, petitioner
has a substantial interest in appealing this proceeding,
and it is submitted that this point alone sufficiently refutes respondents' statement in their motions that, "It
affirmatively appears from said petition for writ of certiorari that the petitioner, Utah Pipe Line Company, does
not have a justiciable interest in the subject matter of
the action."
Further in connection with petitioner's intervention,
petitioner states that its purpose in attempting the intervention above referred to was not only to contest the
application of the Utah Natural Gas Company, but also
to show that it, Utah Pipe Line Company, could better
serve the interest of the public, which the Utah Pipe
Line Company knew at the time of its intervention should
be considered by the Public Service Commission under
the statute requiring that certificates for construction
of this sort would be granted only upon a showing that
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the public interest would be protected by requiring that
the present or future public convenience and necessity
does or will require such construction. (76-4-24, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943; Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, (Sup. Ct. Utah 1941) 117 P. 2d 298).
The purpose, then, of Utah Pipe Line Company was
dual: first, to attempt to show the Commission that it,
not Utah Natural Gas Company, could better serve the
interest of the public; but failing in this, second, to make
certain that the proceedings whereby Utah Natural
Gas Company was granted a certificate would be conducted in the lawful manner required by the statute.
(76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1943). As a party to
such proceedings, Utah Pipe Line Company now prosecutes this appeal and complains that the Commission has
not regularly pursued its authority as required by the
same section above quoted, and that, in addition, the
proceedings and the order growing out of such proceedings violate rights of the Utah Pipe Line Company under
the Constitution of the United States and of the State of
Utah, all as set out in petitioner's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.
The effect on the right to review of beirig a party
to the ,proceeding before the c·ommission is discussed
in Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company v. United
States, (commonly called the Chicago Junction Case) 68
L. ed. U. S. 667 where Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
"The plaintiffs may challenge the order because they are parties to it. The Judicial Code,
Sec. 212 (originally the Commerce Court Act,
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June 1S, 1910, chap. 309, 36 Stat. nt L. 5-!~, Con1p.
Stat. See. 1005), declares that any party to a proreeding before the Con1n1ission nuty, as of right,
become a party to 'any suit "Therein is involved
the validity of such order.' The section does not
in terms prov·ide that such party may instit~tte a
snit to challenge the order. But this is implied.
For, other,Yise, there "'"ould in some cases be no
redress for the injury inflicted by an illegal order.
Moreover, the fact of intervention, allo,ved as it
"~as, implied a finding by the Commission that the
plaintiffs have an interest. In the proceeding
before the Commission, they opposed by evidence
and argument the granting of the application.
This they did as of right. For under the rules
of practice, adopted by the Commission pursuant
to Paragraph 1 of Section 17 of the Interstate
Commerce Act, the intervener becomes a party
to the proceeding, entitled, like any other party,
to appear at the taking of testimony, to produce
and cross-examine witnesses, and to be heard in
person or by counsel. The intervention must be
preceded by an order of the Commission granting
leave; and leave can be granted only to one showing interest. No case has been found in which
either this court or any lower court, has denied
to one who was a party to the proceedings before
the Commission the right to challenge the order
entered therein." (Page 675)
The fundamental problem raised by the motion is,
what is the relationship of Utah Pipe Line Company
to the rights accorded to Utah Natural Gas Company~
If the Commission was without authority, as petitioner
contends, to grant the certificate permitting Utah Natural Gas Company to hold the Salt Lake market while
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others prospected for natural gas, and if petitioner has
been deprived by the unlawful action of the Commission
in itself obtaining a certificate, then petitioner has such
a special interest as to permit review by this Court.
It is manifest that gas cannot be supplied to the consumers in this area by both Utah Natural Gas Con1pany
and Utah Pipe Line Company. The requirements of the
market and the large expenditures requisite for establishing a distribution system preclude the possibility
of duplicate operations. This Court knows that the
duplication of services by public utilities is not in the
public interest and must be avoided. Since the right to
perform the service is wholly dependent upon governmental authorization, it is highly unlikely that a responsible government agency will twice confer this right,
benefit and privilege. The result of these circumstances
is that the action of the Public S.ervice Commission has
conferred the rights and benefits of this gas 1narket
to Utah Natural Gas Company and effectively foreclosed
the market to Utah Pipe Line Company without trial.
Utah Pipe Line Company and Utah Natural Gas
Company were competitors for this market and as such
public convenience and necessity required that the Commission give Utah Pipe Line ·company a full, fair and
lawful hearing before granting any certificate. The right
to serve the market confers a substantial economic benefit. It establishes an exclusive property right of considerable value. If the Commission's action is erroneous
and unlawful as alleged in the petition for the writ,
then Utah Pipe Line Company has suffered serious
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damage to its econo1nic interest nnd is a verson substantially aggrieved by the Co1n1nission's netion. The
memorandum of authorities sub1nitted in behalf of the
Public Service Comn1ission asserts that Utah Pipe Line
Company has no property interest to protect. The use
of such a generalized staten1ent confuses a proper consideration of the real elements of loss and injury. The
writer of the article in Columbia La'v Review ('T ol. 49,
page 793), in summarizing so1ne of the principal bases
for revie,v, says :
"The directness and magnitude of the injury
or threatened injury is usually a factor. In the
Chicago Junction Case, the Court 'vas impressed
by the fact that even though the interest was a
mere competitive one the amount involved was
ten million dollars a year. * * * One of the soundest reasons for standing was stated by the Massachusetts court in holding that a producer of
paper cartons could challenge an order fixing a
higher price for milk in cartons than for milk in
bottles: 'To say that he was not in truth "interested'' and "aggrieved", if the order is illegal,
'vould be unrealistic and would place theory above
fact.' "
Utah Pipe Line Company has tremendous proven
reserves of natural gas now available to supply the Salt
Lake market and the financial ability to construct and
the "know-how" to operate the required pipeline facilities
to supply that market. Its application was filed with the
Federal Power Commission and with the Public Service
Commission to accomplish these purposes. These are
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the economic endeavors and physical resources which
make up Utah Pipe Line Company's property interest
developed in anticipation that the larger property right
in the form of a certificate of convenience and necessity
would be open to acquisition. It is wholly unrealistic
to contend under this situation that Utah Pipe Line
Company is not "a party to the proceeding deeming
hilnself aggrieved."
RESPONDENTS' CASES
In the memorandum of authorities filed by the
respondents they avoid all reference to the Utah statute
(76-6-16) which expressly authorizes a review by "a
party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved" and '
base their argument on the old legal injury theory.
The interests of an aggrieved party protected by a
statutory right to judicial review are broader and the
right of an aggrieved party to a review are more in
keeping with justice than the narrow legalistic injury
theory. Nor do respondents in their memorandum of
authorities consider the effect of the Commission's determination that Utah Pipe Line Company had at the trial
such a legal interest as entitled it to intervene. That
determination in itself reflects on the question of right
to review in a rather decisive fashion.
The cases referred to in the memorandum of authorities of the respondents are distinguishable and of
little value to this Court. Respondents rely on:
The Utah case of Gianulakus v. Sharp (Sup. ct.
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of l~tah, 1928) 71 lTtah 528, 267 P. 1017, the Washington
case of State v. Superior Court for J{iug Co~tnty, 131 P.
2d 943, and the "\\~yoming case of Campbell v. Wyoming
DeL·elopment Company, 100 P. 2d 124, were all original
suits brought in trial courts. Further, the citation from
American Jurisprudence, , . . ol. 39, page 859, comes fro1n
the title ~'Parties", division "Plaintiffs" and deals with
persons who are allowed to institute litigation in courts
of general jurisdiction and does not deal with persons
allowed to apply for review under "statutory certiorari"
such as is now before this Court.
The Gianulakus case, supra, was an original suit in
equity wherein the plaintiff claimed the right to the use
of "\Yaters from springs located on defendant's adjoining
land. In a former case, the rights to the use of the water
had been litigated and the plaintiff here (defendant
there) had lost by a decree giving to the defendant here
(plaintiff there) the right to the use of all the water from
the springs and defendant there (plaintiff here) had
been perpetually enjoined from taking water from the
springs or from interfering with the other's use of the
water. On a plea of res judicata the lower court dismissed this case and on appeal this Court affirmed that dis~issal. The Campbell case, supra, was an original suit
brought in a district court to quiet title to waters. The
Court held that the plaintiffs had no title to the waters
in question.
The Superior Court case, supra, was a suit instituted
by taxpayers of a school district in a court of general
jurisdiction to· enjoin county school board members and
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the county school superintendent from approving and
carrying into effect a contract hiring Beardsly as school
superintendent for one school in the county until the
appeal of Thomas, the superintendent who had been
dismissed and replaced by Beardsly, was finally determined. The taxpayer plaintiffs claimed that the board
had not given sufficient reasons for firing Thomas as was
required by a statute. The lower court dismissed the
suit and the upper court affirmed the dismissal on the
ground that the statute requiring "reasons" had never
gone into effect and that, therefore, the dismissal of
Thomas had not been illegal.
The Aller&; Sharp, Pittsburg and West Virginia and
Edward Hines Yell ow Pine Trustees cases were all cases
brought in U. S. District Courts to enjoin andjor set
aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission
issued pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act. The
section allowing such suits is 49 U.S.C.A. section 1 (20),
which reads in part as follows:
"Any construction, operation, or abandonment contrary to the provisions of this paragraph
... may be enjoined by any court of competent
jurisdiction at the suit of the United States, the
Commission, any commission or regulating body
of the State or States affected, or any party in
interest."
The provisions of Section 76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, allowing "any party to the proceeding deen1ing himself aggrieved" to apply for a writ of certiorari
are more extensive and enlarge upon the right to a review
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as con1pared "~ith a statute per1nitting suit by any party
in interest.
Colmsel for respondents place particular e1nphasis
upon the . .\.Her and Sharp Inc. ease (Commerce Clearing
House X o. 53-95, :Jiay 7, 1951-S F'ed. Carrier Cases).
In that .case Craig Trucking Inc. had authority to operate as a common carrier in the transportation of certain
conunodities between certain prescribed areas. Craig
Trucking Inc. applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission for an enlargement of its rights. Aller and
Sharp Inc. were contract carriers by motor vehicle and
challenged the granting by the I.C.C. of additional rights
to Craig Trucking Inc. The Commission granted the
application and the suit was to enjoin Craig Trucking
Inc. The appellate court held that Aller and Sharp Inc.
had no standing to challenge the grant of the operating
rights to Craig Trucking Inc. in that "it does not have
authority to transport machinery, equipment, materials
and supplies used or in connection with the manufacture
of paper, from the four above named destination points
to Chillicothe." That is to say, the court held that
because different commodities were to be transported
there was no conflict. How different is that case from
the case now before this c·ourt~ Utah Natural Gas
Company and Utah Pipe Line Company propose to
carry the same commodity along essentially the same
route and supply the same market. If Utah Pipe Line
Company proposed to carry natural gas in its line and
Utah Natural Gas Company proposed to carry oil in its
line, then the Aller and Sharp Inc. case might be in point.
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It is believed that the proper test of the applicability ~f case citation to the problem before this court
is measured by its relation to the fact situation from
which the citation develops and the relationship of that
fact situation to the one under consideration by the court.
A comparison of the fact situations existing in the
cases cited by respondent Utah Natural Gas Company
and the fact situation before the court by reason of Utah
Pipe Line Company's petition. for a writ of certiorari
reveals the following:
Moffat Tunnel League et al. v. United States, 53 S.
Ct. 543. Petitioners were unincorporated, voluntary
associations formed by the local communities in and
around Craig, Colorado. They were not competitors of
the D. & R. G. W. R.R., the party favored by the Commission's order. The petitioners were not engaged in the
transportation business. They had no plans to undertake railroad construction or operate any type of a
transportation system. The court characterized their
interest as no more than a sentiment.
Utah Pipe Line Company is a competitor of Utah
Natural Gas Company. Utah Pipe Line Company has
extensive plans for construction of pipe line facilities for
transportation of natural gas. Utah Pipe Line has large
proven gas reserves to market.
The Edward Hines Yellow Pine case (44 S. Ct. 461)
referred to presents a fact situation that is entirely dissimilar to the one now before the court. Petitioners were
large wholesale lumber merchants. They were not competitors *of the railroads who were directly affected by
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the Con1n1ission's order discontinuing penalty eharges
for failure to imn1ediately unload and return freight
cars. Small lumber jobbers 'Yere benefited by this order
because they 'Yere allo,ved to use the freight cars as
\varehouses for a limited period of time. The railroads
made no objection to the order and freely adopted it.
Because the order helped to prevent the large lumber
wholesaler from establishing a monopoly, they objected.
The court, as in the Sprunt case, reasoned that in effect
the injury emanated from the railroads and not the
Commission. That the loss of comparative economic
advantage in an already lucrative market was in reality
no InJury.
Petitioner before this court has much more than the
loss of a comparative advantage to protect. It seeks
to protect a right to an exclusive market.
Rochester Telephone Corp. v. U. 8., 59 s. Ct. 754.
An order of the F.C.C. had classified petitioner as being
controlled by a New York Telephone Company and
hence subject to certain regulatory requirements of
the Commission. Petitioner objected to the classification. The lower court, with the full record of the Commission's determination before it, dismissed on the merits
the petitioner's request to set aside the order. On appeal
to the U. S. Supreme Court the question of standing to
seek review was brought up for consideration. The court
held that petitioner did have standing to challenge the
Commission's order and was properly before the court.
The lower court's decision was upheld after the Supreme
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nection with the question of standing, the court discarded
the negative order doctrine holding it to be an unrealistic
technical device which confused rather than clarified the
problem of who had standing to question a Commission
order~ Therefore, the case illustrates a situation where
the petitioner was held to be entitled to question or challange the Commission's order. Utah Natural Gas Colnpany has apparently erroneously cited the case for the
opposite proposition.
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas,
64 S. Ct. 281. The quote from this case included by Utah
Natural Gas in its memorandum relates to petitioner's
objection to a finding by the Commission that past rates
charged by petitioners were too high. The finding was
made on the complaint of the City of Cleveland and in
aid of state regulation. The finding in no way harmed
petitioner (Hope Natural Gas) because it did not affect
the present charges nor did it subject petitioner to any
penalties, governmental or otherwise; nor did it create
any consumer claims against petitioner. The real controversy of the case was in relation to the c·ommission's
order establishing the present rates. In connection with
that order petitioner was accorded standing to challenge.
The finding in relation to past rates was merely an unimportant incident of the case.

L. Singer & Sons v. U. P. RR., 61 S. Ct. 254, was
not a petition to review a commission order. It was
rather a suit for an injunction to restrain· extension
of railroad facilities without first obtaining a certificate
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sale food broker located near the Kansas City, Missouri
farmers' market. Kansas City, Kansas proposed to construct facilities for a farmers' market in that city. The
respondent railroad offered to buy some of the bonds
issued by the city to finance the project and also the
railroad offered to lay tracks into the market. Petitioner
objected to the railroad providing the transportation
facilities because such facilities might enable food
brokers located in the Kansas City, Kansas area to
compete with them. The court held that petitioner was
not a party in interest because it in effect could show
only the possibility that adverse competition might
develop. In addition, petitioner had no right to question
how the respondent railroad employed its facilities since
this was not a proceeding before an administrative body.
This fact situation is entirely foreign to the situation
before this court.
Alabama Power v. Ickes, et al., 58 S·. Ct. 300, 82 L.
ed 374. Ickes was Federal Emergency Administrator
of Public Works during the depression and Congress
had appropriated money for the purpose of stimulating
reemployment. Among other things public buildings
were being sponsored and municipalities were obtaining
grants for such construction. Alabama Power Company
served electric power to certain municipalities. These
municipalities entered into agreements with Ickes as
such administrator under which the municipalities proposed to build municipal power plants with federal funds.
Alabama Power Company brought suit against Ickes
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to enjoin the performance of the agreements. The court
denied an injunction.
Syl 2-"The interest of a taxpayer in the
moneys of the Federal Treasury is not sufficient
to enable him to maintain a suit to enjoin an
alleged unlawful use of such moneys."
Obviously the Alabama Power case is not in point
here.
Respondents would have the court believe that petitioner is in the classification of a person having an interest common to the public generally. Such is not the
situation in the case before the court. The special interest of Utah Pipe Line Company which it has asserted
from the beginning of this controversy is peculiar to
this petitioner and to no other person. It is that special
interest which Utah Pipe Line Company seeks to protect in this proceeding. It is that interest which Utah
Pipe Line Company sought to protect before the Public
Service c·ommission of Utah.
CONCLUSION
F·or the purpose of respondents' motions, the Court
must assume that the facts set forth in the petition of
Utah Pipe Line Company are true. The petition shows
that before the amended application of Utah Natural
Gas Company was heard by the Public S.ervice Commission of Utah, Utah Pipe Line Company had filed with
the F!ederal Power Commission for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity wherein it sought permission
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to construct and operate a natural gas pipe line essentially along the same route as proposed by Utah Natural
Gas Company but extending into a point near Aztec,
New :Mexico; that Utah Pipe Line Company proposed
to serve the sarne market as was to be served by Utah
Natural Gas Company. In the petition of Utah Pipe
Line Company for leave to intervene in the Utah Natural Gas Company case, Utah Pipe Line Company set
forth:
"9. That said projects of your petitioner and
of applicant are in direct competition and that
it is in the public interest that this Honorable
Commission be given factual data upon which
it may determine as to which of said projects
would result in the best possible service in the
public interest."
The petition for writ of re·view also sets forth that on
the 26th day of January, 1951, Utah Pipe Line Company filed its application No. 3578 with the Public
Service Commission of Utah for authority to construct
and operate the natural gas pipe line system set forth
in its application then pending with the FedeTal Power
Commission and that on January 27, 1951 and in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Federal Power
Commission and the Public Service Commission of Utah,
Utah Pipe Line Company requested a "joint hearing"
on its then pending applications. The petition for writ
of review sets forth that notwithstanding these matters
the Commission refused to permit Utah Pipe Line Company to offer any evidence as to the New Mexico reserves
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and their availability to Utah and in effect limited Utah
Pipe Line to an examination of the alleged reserves
and financial condition of Utah Natural Gas Company.
Utah Pipe Line Company in its petition for the writ
specifically set forth (paragraph 11) the basis for this
action. Among other things Utah Pipe Line Company
alleged there was no competent substantial evidence to
sutain the findings of the Commission; that the Commission improperly delegated its authority; that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in limiting
the participation of Utah Pipe Line Company in the
proceeding; that the Commission acted in violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution of the State
of Utah and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in not permitting Utah
Pipe Line Company to show the extent of its reserves
in New Mexico and the pendency of its application before
the Federal Power Commission; and that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not processing
the application of Utah Pipe Line Company then pending
before it and particularly in not having a joint hearing
thereon with the Federal Power Commission.
Legal standing to sue is the narrow issue now before
this Court. The record of the Commission is not before
the Court and without such record the Court cannot
properly consider the issues raised by the petition for
review. For the purpose of respondents' motions the
allegations of the petition for the writ of certiorari must
be assumed as true. The statement in respondents'
memorandum of authorities that interminable delay
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would result if the Commission "\Vas required to process
a series of applications before it could decide one application is beside the point. The application of Utah Pipe
Line Company 'vas the only application before the Commission at the tin1e the Utah Natural Gas matter was
being tried. Nothing prevented the Public Service Commission of Utah from ordering an immediate hearing
upon the application of Utah Pipe Line Company. The
Commission arbitrarily elected to not process that application and now maintains that position. If the Commission had regularly pursued its authority it would have
granted a full hearing to this intervener in the Utah
Natural Gas Company case so that it could be determined
in the public interest what other sources of gas supply
might be available to the Salt Lake market. The narrow
issues on which the Public Service Commission of Utah
required the case to be tried violated the rights of this
petitioner and authorizes this review.
Respondents' statement that Utah Pipe Line Company "is in much the same position as a low bidder on a
public contract who seeks judicial review of the award
of the contract to another bidder," should be paraphrased
by saying that Utah Pipe Line Company is in much the
same position as a low bidder who has submitted a sealed
bid as the specifications required, and whose sealed bid
is kept in the file and ignored by the administrative
agency at the opening of bids and the awarding of the
contract.

On the basis of the foregoing it is submitted that
petitioner, Utah Pipe Line Company, has, in its petition
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for writ of certiorari, established its right to the writ
as granted by this Court and has, if same be necessary,
shown that it has whatever interest is required in the
subject matter of this review. The motions to dismiss
should, therefore, be overruled.
Respectfully submitted,
C. W. WILKINS
CHENEY, MARR, WILKINS & CANNON
920 Continental National Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
TURNER, ATWOOD, WHITE, McLANE
AND FRANCIS
Suite 1711
Mercantile Bank Building
Dallas 1, Texas
(s) C. W. WILKINS
Of Counsel
Attorneys for Utah Pipe Line Company,
Petitioner

Received copy this 2nd day of June, 1951.
(s) CALVIN L. RAMPTON,

Attorney for Public Service Commission
of Utah, et al., Respondents
( s) CLIFFORD L. AsHTON
( s)
M. CoRNWALL

s.

Attorneys for Utah Natural Gas Company,
Respondent
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